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is that of a lawyer, not a teacher. I speak to you
as one who, having been a student at such a law
school as this, has practiced law for twenty years.
Let it be plain that I do not indict the law schools,
nor the law teachers. But every one of you will
agree that all of us have a common enemy. It is
that which impairs the high quality of our thinking.
I intend to discuss certain intellectual attitudes
commonly expressed in the law schools which I
think destructive of the free manifestation of that
intelligence which is our heritage. A wise man has
said, "So live that the man you wish to be at forty,
may be." Each of you is now the potter and your
hand should not shake. Goethe said, "Let the
young man take care what he asks in his youth,
for in his age he shall have it."
The best thing about the lawyer's life is that,
if you are big enough, it is a life of endless intellectual growth. That growth of your mind is your
life, for your life is not made by externals. Emerson said, "Nothing is, at last, sacred but the integrity of your own mind." He might well have
said, "Nothing is, at last, important but the infinite
unfoldment of your own mind." The two are really
the same-for the integrity of your mind is attained
by a slow growth and its genesis is that infinite
capacity for, and the taking of, infinite pains, to the
end that its natural enrichment may appear.. This
has been seen as the source of genius.
The natural mind of man is a spontaneous
bubbling up of native intelligence. Children have
this until they become self-conscious. You can perhaps remember that you had it in your youth and,
if I am not mistaken, you will observe that as you
proceeded through your schooling it faded as you
became more self conscious, more impressed by the
thinking of others and more burdened with hard
work in thinking. The psychologists, who have
been studying the training of children, have learned
that one thing which greatly inhibits the free play
of their natural -intelligence is consciousness of self.
The whole development of the training of children
in modern progressive schools has proceeded upon
the basis of a careful recognition of this fact. As I
observe the thought processes current in law
schools, in the light of my experience as a law stu*Mr. Craven was for many years Valuation Counsel for the Western Railroads. The address here printed was delivered before the Duke
University Bar Association on March 9, 1938.

dent and lawyer, I am impressed with the extent
to which the student's thought is robbed of its
natural versatility and spontaneity. My thesis here
tonight is that this is because there is a failure to
avail ourselves of the high privilege and power of
objective and impersonal thinking.
What is impersonal thinking? You and I
watch an elephant walk up the street. Well, he
just comes up the street! We critically observe
him. He comes without our effort or responsibility. We need not think about ourselves. We like
to look at him but we do not want to own him.
Our thought about him is purely objective and impersonal.
Yet, our thought may not be purely impersonal. When fear or desire comes in, we may say,
"Will he walk on me?" or "May I own him?" Or
"Oh! There is the professor of elephantology. I
must find out what he thinks of the elephant, and
there is Professor So-and-so over there. He is a
practical elephantician. He traveled with a circus
and carried water to the elephants for fifteen years.
What does he think of the elephant and, oh dear.
what will he think of what I think of the elephant !"
Such thinking is not impersonal.
My first illustration-impersonal thinking-is
the thinking of the seasoned lawyer, the thinking
you students will come to have, the thinking you
should have now. The second illustration is the
thinking I had as a law student. The first is real
thinking about the elephant. The second is not,
because if I think about what you think regarding
what I think about the elephant, I am thereby
really thinking about myself, not about the elephant
at all. And this is the birthplace of intellectual
egotism and untold limitation. Fear and self-consciousness, if'you have them, prevent your calm
consideration of the law, because they incline you
to think of yourselves. Deference to the personality
of others is similarly obstructive. Your thought
is thus diverted from its right object. This is why
you find learning the law difficult. You are not
thinking of the law.
After years of effort in trying to think objectively, I can see how my law school training almost defeated it. I can see that the same obstructions beset you. I was brought into a thought field
which was entirely new. I stood before it with the
awe of the uninitiated for a vast something of which
I was ignorant. It involved strange impressions,
new concepts, was couched in a strange language.
My problem was to make that thinking my own and
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this I valiantly attempted at the rate of reading,
say, fifty pages of hard cases a day.
My way as a student, as yours, was made
harder by certain bad habits and traditions of the
lawyer and law teacher. Modern scholarship generally is now denying that many branches of thinking are sciences, which for generations have been
paraded about as such. The law is in no respect a
real science. The law is merely a body of thought
which reflects certain phases of man's thinking
about human relationships. It does not lie in planes
of precision, and is not, nor can it be, entirely logical. Nor need it be highly complicated. I have
had long experience in a highly technical field involving a congeries of legal, economic, accounting
and engineering principles. Some of the cases appeared to be very complicated. But every one of
them ultimately resolved around a few essentially
simple principles. Common sense, not occult theory,
was their key. This is, I think, true of the greater
part of the body of our law. Pascal said, "The great
thing is to be simple.
But it is so hard to be
simple." Certainly it is not the way of wisdom to
try deliberately to make things complicated.
But we lawyers, and especially we law teachers, have been guilty, largely unconsciously, of a
sort of affectation. Ours has been a learned profession and our egotism has inclined us to strut. We
cannot resist the temptation to invest the law with
an appearance of vast profundity. This is a natural
inclination-in part, the result of a sort of selfhypnosis, because frail humanity finds one measure
of its worth in its work, and is prone to magnify
its difficulty and importance. Each thinks he sees
high qualities in his chosen field which none other
sees. The automobile salesman honestly thinks his
automobile the best.
Further, most people are
guilty of the assumption that a man is learned or
should be thought to be so if he expresses simplicities in profound language. The practice has
been common to the medicine men of the tribes of
all the ages. Thus, we may in part account for
the pompous language of court decisions, the unnecessary repetition in the language of pleadings
and contracts, the hypercritical and supertheoretical
structure of many of the law review articles, and
their attempts to find intricate and involved legal
explanations of which the courts themselves would
be neither capable nor guilty.
There is even an unnecessary ostentation in
our display of industry. We are. told solemnly that
we should not submit an article to a law review
with notes less than three inches deep. These articles and decisions are the admiration of all aspirants to law review editorial boards, which cite
forty decisions in support of propositions not even
in dispute, when a single leading case would do.
Law work is done in a laborious way consistent
with its claimed importance and profundity. The
lawyer, like Atlas, is never pictured as upholding
his universe with spontaneity. He has the frown
of deep responsibility which to the close observer
looks like seriousness.
To this law school world, partly real and partly
affectation, I came as a student. I came with such
spontaneity, individuality, and freedom as were left
to my mind after experiencing the regimentation
of my under-graduate experience. You will observe
that the elements which I have named all tend to
make the student think the work difficult and his

capacities inadequate. The effect upon me of all
this combination of circumstances was to give me
an inferiority complex and a personal sense of
great responsibility.
The manner of our instruction perpetuates
these errors. The law student sets forth valiantly
to acquire what appear to be things external to him,
and to make them part of himself. He is going to
own the elephant. He is certain to get the impression that this acquiring (i.e. learning) and keeping
(i.e. remembering) is the essential nature of the
educative process. Now, if the essential function
of the lawyer were to go about retailing his information like an itinerant Oriental story teller, this
method would perhaps be well adapted to the end.
But the lawyer is a creator, not a mere retailer. His
education should be by a process of unfoldment of
his natural powers rather than by an accretion of
external facts. The free play of the spontaneous
intelligence, the resourceful, colorful, activity of
the reasoning powers of the first class lawyer, are
quite unlike the activity of a mere mental storekeeper, with his facts all nicely arranged in well
ordered boxes, whose contents he dispenses to his
clients.
These legal mental storekeepers make
fairly good law clerks, not lawyers. The factual
information, the rules of law, can always be readily
found; it is their resourceful use under wise generalship which is difficult. If you think of your mind
as a limited sort of storehouse, into which you pile
all the things you can grasp, you have an entirely
false idea of what education is. It is absolutely
unnecessary to make this learning a part of yourself. You make a mistake to try to learn it by that
process. The great body of the law is all there.
Any part of it is easily available to you. The greatest step in learning it is made when you really know
that. It is absolutely useless to try to make anything permanently part of yourself that you do not
love, and it is hard to love anything which you can
acquire only with a struggle. Fear and the very
struggle push it away. How do you account for
the remarkable statement which you sometimes
hear students make-that as soon as they have
passed the examination, they intend to burn their
case books and their note books? That attitude of
revulsion is the proof that the process is wrong.
By what possibility can the student reason objectively when, as at some of our leading law
schools, he has been invited, at the beginning of the
course, to look at the two students beside him and
remember that one will certainly flunk?
Is it not simple enough to see why the academic
process makes us self conscious? It is not on an
impersonal basis. If you think of your mind as a
sort of storehouse into which you are piling your
acquisitions in a selfish process to avoid academic
extinction, you become selfish. You engage egotistically in a contemplation of your storehouse and a
comparison of it with that of others, and, mark my
words, your storehouse will always seem paltry to
you; you will alvays be hampered with a fear about
it, and your natural and real powers will be hindered in their ripening. There is nothing finer than
to work hard, if for the love of it. But if, in the
love of self, you stuff your paltry cupboard so that,
like a cheap minded housewife, you may display
your Mid-Victorian furniture to the envy of your
neighbors. your mental life will be that of the
drudge. This is the explanation of that common
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phenomenon among our American lawyers-the
drudge mind and the intellectual egotist. When
the housewife displays her egotism and pride in
her furniture, we see her at once as a Mrs. Babbitt.
But in the academic world we are not so certain
to see scholarly ostentation of mere mental bric-abrac for what it really is. University people who
regard themselves as liberals point to the selfishness and egotism of a capitalistic society resulting
from the emphasis on material acquisitiveness-and
it is detestable. But they are frequently blind to
the fact that a brother in the blood stands boldly
by his side-the selfishness and egotism resulting
from the false processes of intellectual acquisitiveness-and that a society suffering from material
egotism will not be saved by a class trained in intellectual egotism.
The world lies about you as a thing of beauty,
which you do not have to acquire. The world of
legal learning is here in identically the same way.
You should look at it, should become thoroughly
acquainted with it, and by holding a right attitude
of mind, should come to love it. When you come
to love it with a free mentality, unencumbered by
any selfish desire to own it, as much of it will be
yours as you need, and when you need it. This
freedom is something the drudge mind never acquires. Nor can it even understand how it can be.
The happy thing about the life of the lawyer
is that he may come to think objectively and impersonally, because the fine discipline of his rigorous life in the practice emancipates him from false
gods. My thesis tonight is that you should begin
to shake loose your shackles while in the law
school. The essence of the free mind, and of the
able mind, is a certain selflessness. "Humility is
the beginning of wisdom," and that humility the
lawyer acquires who matures. His dogmatic certitude gradually fades. He comes to see that the
law is not an exact science. And while he has a
great regard for, and interest in, the law, any egotistical inclination to be proud of what he has acquired of it eventually fades out. The bigger he is,
the less pretentious he is. As he matures he claims
to know less about the law and becomes a better
lawyer by the process. Of the few eminent lawyers
I have happened to know, none had any intellectual
pride. They appreciate that the law is of purely
finite character; that logic is not divine, that it
works equally well for devil or saint; that, as Aristotle said, "Only an amateur expects exactitude in
life;" that one should never fail to know, as exactly
as one may, every bit of the law there is with reference to his problem; but that one should not
confuse case learning with wisdom, mere intellectual cleverness with power. As the lawyer matures,
it is the common experience that he expresses himself more simply, avoids long sonorous sentences
and many syllabled words, and tries to win his case
through the simple statement of the truth rather
than through a "learned" brief, redundant with the
citations of alleged authorities. May we not have
the same simplicity and humility in the law
schools? Why should we have anything else?
Mr. Emerson said, "Nothing, at last, is sacred
but the integrity of your own mind." The free play
of your innate and natural intelligence-and that is
vour "own mind"-is your real being and the thing
by which you are to come, if ever, into the stature
of your real selfhood. In order to provide the food
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essential to enrich your consciousness, it is well to
know what the thinking of man has produced in
your chosen field. But it is essential, if you are to
maintain your own integrity, that you do your
And it is destructive of that
own thinking.
integrity, if you swamp your own individuality
with the thinking of other men, which if it
ever was real thought, was the expression of
their minds with reference to their problems.
Here is the great vice of dependence upon precedent and of deference to mere human personality and opinion. The academic world is always
loudly claiming more independence of thought than
is found in the outside world. But every time a
Brandeis or a Pound walks across the pages of a
law review, every letter on the page performs a
pretty typographical obeisance. Every time one of
these transatlantic "Leviathans" glides quietly out
to sea (and both of these men are very able men),
all the little puffing tug boats in the harbor blow
their whistles so long that they have to suspend
traffic for the rest of the forenoon until they can get
up steam again. The matured practitioner shows
no such deference to frail humanity. Deference to
mere personal opinion is no part of the search for
truth, for the truth is inevitably impersonal.
That such processes and mental environments
warp the mentality of many law students is shown
by the appraisal which lawyers make of many men
just graduated from law school. They sometimes
say that the course at some of our best law schools
is "three years in and six years out"-which means
that it takes six years to restore the natural resiliency and bounce of a man's mentality, when preserved in the academic salt barrel. They see that
there is high danger in academic training of its
teaching the student to distrust his native intuition
and common sense, by establishing his trust in
something external to him, thereby making him untrue to himself. I have frequently heard lawyers
complain that the law graduate is too greatly impressed with the false idea that the law is a science
and a difficult one; that he continually seeks for
authority in the thinking of other people as expressed in decisions or text books, and is incapable
of that free play of versatility and resourcefulness,
which is the heritage of the untrammelled mind;
that his native intelligence is temporarily obstructed by his bad scholastic habits. A free mind
knows no precedents. It looks at the problem in a
fresh way, and forges its own conclusions in a pattern none other than its own. The truth is alive,
and the man who wins lawsuits is the man who
keeps his thinking fresh, who forms his thought
patterns in something else than the conventional
mold. But the drudge mind is the product of that
scholastic attitude, by which the chief end of man
is to glorify, not divine intelligence, but the intelligence of the instructor, by handing him back the
instructor's own thinking, in the instructor's own
language.
Now, I am speaking of my own experience.
The problem which I had to meet as a young lawyer in escaping from the bad mental habits due to
my conventional lav school training, was the hardest problem that I have ever met. The training
had produced in me, as it does with thousands of
young men, a lawyer with a mind as egotistic and
brittle as that of an Italian prima donna. Impersonal and objective thought was quite beyond my
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capacity. This was the result of the congeries of
fear, self interest, deference to transatlantic liners,
and a conception of the great difficulty of the law.
To those of you who have the responsibility of
molding law school traditions, I say that my condition was not my fault. So long as I did work of an
unimportant character, I limped along fairly well
with my law school mental habits. But when I
reached work of actual size, I actually had to discard all of my law school habits and establish new
ones, in order to avoid nervous breakdowns after I
had had one, and was threatened with a second.
Men never break down from overwork. They break
down because of brittle minds. The great strength
of the tree is in" that it knows how to bend.
You may say: You have spoken about the corrosive effect of egotism. Is it not true that some
of the most effective men in the legal profession
are men of that hardboiled, egotistical type who, by
dint. of hard work and by processes of acquisition,
have taken unto themselves, as the successful business man gathers property or money, the knowledge of the law which has made them a power in
their universe?
The reply is: In the infinite variety of examples
afforded by human individuals, one may find proof
for any thesis. But after observing the mental activity of a great many men, I am sure that human
egotism kills more men than bad whiskey. Humility, not human egotism, is the beginning of wisdom. The most efficient mind is an objective and
impersonal mind because it is alive and adaptable. The young lawyer's greatest enemy is not
his ignorance of the law, but his fear, which is due
to our system of scholastic training putting continual emphasis on the personal ego. Yet observe
that Jesus said, "Of my own self I can do nothing."
The Bible says that "Humility is the beginning of
wisdom." Lincoln said that he recognized in himself merely a stewardship and an agency. On the
other hand, Woodrow Wilson is now commonly
recognized as having failed in making effective the
very high degree of human idealism, which he expressed in his fourteen points, by his complete inability to get himself out of the way, and to divorce
a great ideal from his mere human personality. He
held a lamp that had a great light with a clutch so
tight that he shattered it. This failure of life to
produce a leader big enough to be humble was one
of the great tragedies of the war. Lincoln understood life better and would have made no such mistake. Jesus made it plain that the truth is always
an impersonal thing, and that its mastery is not
properly by any egotistic process. But it seems to
me that humility is neither the beginning, nor the
end, of much of our scholastic learning:
The dangers in legal dogmatism in a rapidly
evolving world, its heavy penalties in the law's past
unfoldment, the necessity that the lawyer solve today's problems in a way to reflect the wisdom of
the past only if.it be today's intelligence, are important considerations clear to every one. But does
not our legal training produce the conventional
type of thinking which we are well aware we should
avoid? The world demands from the lawyer the
same quick sensitiveness to the truth which has
given the modern scientific mind its remarkable
advances. The brittle mind is not the mind of the
modern scientist, nor of the modern lawyer. He is
continually faced with new problems, and needs

the resourceful intelligence which can devise new
means of solving them. He has learned from experience that, as Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "certitude is not the test of certainty," that "delusive
exactness is a source of fallacy throughout the
law," and that the essential nature of most legal
controversies is a conflict of contradictory rights,
some of which must yield, even when all appear
unqualified. Experience has taught him to distrust
the dogmatist, who looks to precedent for the precise, when the best fruit of fresh perception is apt
to be the unprecedented and approximate.
One of his important functions is in the conduct of negotiations involving conflicting interests.
Here it is his privilege and duty to lead a group of
antagonists out of the claims of intrenched selfishness, which are usually based upon what are regarded as "rights" but which have no such definite
substance, along lines of conciliation to settlements
which express a higher right than the attrition and
expense of court controversy are apt to produce.
We daily observe the courts' battlefield strewn with
debris which expresses, not the courts' mistakes,
but the stubbornness of the brittle minded lawyer,
in insisting upon the egotistic assertion of "rights,"
which from a more objective viewpoint should have
been seen as claims. In controversies where results
are needed in accord with good business judgment,
or in accord with a true conception of right relationships between the client and the public or the
government, the dogmatic lawyer insisting upon
technical rights is apt to do great harm. Especially
before the administrative tribunals, we have frequently seen the progressive advance of great industries, and their right relationships with the public and with the government, obstructed through
the technical controversies of the lawyers, waged
through the insistence upon the unyielding and the
exact with reference to the indeterminable and inexact-lawyers representing the public quite as
much as those representing the industries. These
are failures of our profession, failures to which our
methods of legal education are a contributing cause.
As a profession we need to learn the ways of peace
and that humility is the frequent beginning of fine
victories where egotistical insistence fails. When
a man ceases to proceed egotistically it does not
mean spineless negativity. It means that for the
first time he finds the full measure of his real efficiency.
Now I am somewhat disturbed about this
speech, for it has not a single inch of annotations
and so no shred of scholastic respectability. I must
cure this by quoting some profound and resounding
authority. I shall end by quoting from a Chinaman. This is from the works of that great medieval
metaphysician of the 3rd Century, Tao San. You
might have some trouble to find it in the books for
he was brought into being for the purpose of this
occasion.
Weary, I asked of Tao Lung, "Where is
magnanimity?" He was then old. He said:
"I knew not until my third wife came,-the
lovely Looan Tou, in whose untutored and, so,
untired, eyes the light of wisdom lay. I said,
'Even the crazy goose wings north each
spring upon his appointed way, as though upon
the winds of destiny; while I, the most learned
of my time, like a dry and withered lily pad,
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am tossed about my garden by every wind that
blows.'
And she said, 'He sits in darkness, who
holds unto himself, as though he owned, his
paltry lamp with guttering flame. Come with

me into the garden, where the plum trees
bloom, and where the sun, majestic and unowned, surveys the all it owns.' "
And, in conclusion, may I ask, where is Magnanimity?
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May Cory.of 1932.
New York:
putes. By HelenArbitration
OMPULSORY
International
DisColumbia University Press. Pp. xiii, 281.-This
volume is an extraordinarily precise statement of bilateral and multilateral experience with the idea of
the compulsory arbitration of international disputes
in the 19th and 20th centuries. With a restraint seldom exhibited in this field, Miss Cory has kept her
text confined to her title. Examination of the treaty
product since 1820 provided the material for what
amounts to a historical narrative of the development
of the ideas of compulsory arbitration, for there have
been two. The practice of arbitrating was at first
voluntary and ad hoc to the specific dispute. Treaties
obligating states in advance to arbitrate disputes were
before the Great War referred to as compulsory, and
emphasis was laid upon the scope of the categories of
the disputes to be so treated. Since the Great War
and the existence of the jurisdictions of the League
of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice, compulsory arbitration has implied reference to
a dispute by unilateral state application, with an incidental restriction of the excepted questions.
Bilaterally and multilaterally, there have been
some two dozen styles of compulsory arbitration in
the broad sense of a system of pacific settlement in
which the pronouncement has binding force. For the
first time, Miss Cory identifies each of these types,
showing how their operative clauses have progressively
affected the development of jurisdictional scope. The
accuracy of this analysis makes the book a contribution to historical jurisprudence.
The postwar period is overshadowed by the Optional Clause establishing the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Permanent Court and the rapid increase of
the compromissory clause. Between publication and
the writing of this review the parties to the Optional
Clause have risen from 37 to 42 states which are subject to unilateral suit within the terms of their subscribing declarations. The increase in number of coinpromissory clauses is rightly regarded as "the most
encouraging development of the postwar period," but
the existing number of them, given as 300, is a con-

Books

siderable understatement. The value of compulsory
arbitration is defined as removing that uncertainty as
to the intentions of states which obstructs an international sense of security.
Reservations to bilateral and multilateral treaties
have been greatly reduced and simplified, but in their
nature provide loopholes of escape. Miss Cory rightly
comments that the new exception of "domestic jurisdiction" plays the same part as the obsolete "vital interests," but does not mention that "domestic jurisdiction" is a legally determinable fact at any given
time. The Optional Clause bases jurisdiction upon the
existence of a "legal question," which is still undefined
internationally. The compromissory clause obliges the
parties to a treaty, which defines their engagements, to
submit their disputes arising under it to arbitration;
by its use in all fields of international relations and
frequent reliance upon it, states are becoming habituated to conducting their affairs within the conception
of law.
Boston.
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Aron's Notes on Proof: The Probative Law. By
Harold G. Aron. 1932. New York: Georgic Press.
Pp. xxiv, 561.
Handbook on the Law of Evidence. By John Jay
McKelvey. 1932. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. Pp.
xix, 576.
That there is a growing need and demand for
a change in our court procedure and in the production of proof is indicated in two recent books of decidedly dissimilar techniques of approach. The Fourth
Edition of McKelvey's Handbook on the Law of Evide~we treats the subject in the traditional Hornbook
manner, being concerned primarily with a brief "presentation of the law of evidence with respect to its
origin, growth, and present status." It is a distinct
improvement over former editions of the work, adding,
as stated in the preface, "some material indicative of
the current trend of the Law of Evidence towards a
maturity less rigid and more in harmony with (to
quote the words of Professor Wigmore) 'the idea

